Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
六安市人民政府办公室关于印发六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理实施细则的通知
安徽省六安市人民政府办公室
六安市人民政府办公室关于印发六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理实施细则的通知
六政办〔2009〕49号
金安区、裕安区人民政府，开发区管委，市政府各部门、各直属机构：
《六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理实施细则》已经市政府同意，现印发给你们，请遵照执行。
二○○九年六月三十日
六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理实施细则
第一条 为加强城市户外广告管理，提升城市管理水平，根据《中华人民共和国城乡规划法》、《中华人民共和国广告法》、《安徽省城市市容和环境卫生管理条例》及《六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理办法》（六政〔2007〕3号），结合本市实际，特制定本实施细则。
第二条 六安市市容环境卫生管理部门依照法律、法规和市政府相关规定，负责城市规划区范围内户外广告的招标、拍卖、申请受理和监督管理工作。
市城市建设、规划、工商、交通、公安、气象、环境保护等部门依照有关法律、法规和自身职责，做好户外广告的监督管理工作。
第三条 市市容环境卫生管理部门依据六安市户外广告设置总体规划负责牵头组织编制专项规划，并征求有关部门和专家的意见后，送规划行政主管部门审核，报市人民政府批准公布实施。
经公布实施的户外广告专项规划不得随意更改，确需调整的必须按照规定的程序予以批准。
第四条 市市容环境卫生管理部门依据户外广告设置规划和专项规划的要求，按照《中华人民共和国招标投标法》、《中华人民共和国拍卖法》等规定，通过公开招标、拍卖的方式出让市重要区域、主要道路上政府投资建设的公共建筑物、构筑物、场地、设施设置户外广告的泊位使用权。
市市容环境卫生管理部门应依照《六安市城市规划区户外广告设置管理办法》的相关规定，制定户外广告泊位使用权分期分批拍卖方案，报市政府批准后具体负责实施。
第五条 城市规划区范围内已出让户外广告设置权的路段，按照要求统一规范，对不符合城市规划、市容管理要求的户外广告，依法限期改造或拆除；对未经城市规划行政主管部门批准，不符合户外广告设置规划要求设置的户外广告，依法予以拆除。
第六条 公共建筑物、构筑物、场地、设施的户外广告泊位拍卖所得上缴市财政，实行收支两条线，用于户外广告和市容市貌的维护和管理等。
第七条 在城市规划区范围内建筑物、构筑物和设施上张挂、张贴户外广告的单位和个人，在设置前必须按照《安徽省城市市容和环境卫生管理条例》和市人民政府的相关规定，携带相关材料，向市政务服务中心市容环境卫生管理部门窗口提出申请。
第八条 广告经营者设置户外广告设施，应当按照市市容环境卫生管理部门批准的户外广告设施设计方案、施工图实施，不得擅自变更。户外广告设施竣工后，市市容环境卫生管理部门应当组织有关部门对其进行核查。
第九条 户外广告设施经营者（户外广告管理责任人）应当保持户外广告设施的牢固安全、功能完好，定期对户外广告设施进行安全检查，承担安全责任；危及安全的应当及时维护、更新、加固或拆除，遇大风、汛期应当及时采取安全防范措施。
市市容环境卫生管理部门对户外广告设施存在安全隐患可能危及人身、财产安全的，应当责令管理责任人立即排除安全隐患，不能立即排除的，应当责令限期排除，并督促、落实安全隐患的排除工作。在限期排除期间，管理责任人应当在安全隐患现场的明显位置设置警示标志，必要时还应当派人值守，防止发生事故。
第十条 在户外广告设置过程中，违反《中华人民共和国城乡规划法》、《中华人民共和国广告法》、《安徽省城市市容和环境卫生管理条例》相关规定的，由市城市综合管理行政执法部门和工商行政管理部门依法予以处罚。
第十一条 当事人对处罚决定不服的，可以依法申请行政复议或者提起行政诉讼。
第十二条 户外广告设置有关行政工作人员玩忽职守、监用职权、徇私舞弊，尚未构成犯罪的，依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，移交司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
第十三条 本规定具体应用中的问题，由市市容环境卫生管理局负责解释。
第十四条 本规定自发布之日起实施。
